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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Christopher R. Schultz appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
Schultz filed for post-conviction relief from his sentences for robbery and 
attempted rape with a weapon enhancement. (R., p. 8.) He claimed his trial 
counsel had been ineffective in sentencing proceedings for failing to advise him 
of his "rights against self incrimination" and failing to secure due process. (R., p. 
10.) He alleged that his trial counsel "forc[ed]" him to "accept the plea deal" and 
"fail[ed] to hold the prosecutor to the benefit of the [plea] bargain." (R., p. 11.) In 
his accompanying affidavit he alleged he "was never fully advised of the his [sic] 
rights against self incrimination ... that may result from any or all information he 
mayor may not disclose during any psychological, psychosexual, or social 
sexual evaluations." (R., pp. 14-15.) 
The state filed an answer and a motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 38-40, 54-65.) 
The district court granted the motion to dismiss. (R., pp. 85-90.) The district 
court dismissed the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on the grounds 
that they were vague and not supported by admissible evidence. (R., pp. 88-90.) 
Schultz filed a timely notice of appeal from the order summarily dismissing his 
petition. (R., pp. 93-94.) 
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ISSUES 
Schultz states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court err when it summarily dismissed Mr. 
Schultz's claims that he received ineffective assistance of counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 5.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Schultz failed to demonstrate on appeal that he made a showing in 
the district court of admissible evidence such as would create a material 
issue of fact regarding his claim that his counsel was ineffective for failing 
to advise him of his right to silence in regard to sentencing evaluations? 
2. Has Schultz failed to show on appeal that the district court erred by 
dismissing his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for allegedly 
failing to enforce a plea agreement that was never made? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Schultz Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erred By Dismissing 
His Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Allegedly Failing To Advise 
Him Of His Right To Silence In Regard To Sentencing Evaluations 
A. Introduction 
The district court concluded that the evidence Schultz submitted in support 
of his claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of his right 
against self-incrimination at sentencing was "bare, conclusory, and incomplete" 
and did not "sufficiently support both prongs of the required showing for 
ineffective assistance of counsel." (R., p. 89.) Schultz claims this was error 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 9-12), but review of the record supports the district court's 
holding. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On appeal from summary dismissal of a post-conviction petition, the 
appellate court reviews the record to determine if a genuine issue of material fact 
exists, which, if resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle the applicant to the 
requested relief. Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 807, 839 P.2d 1215, 1221 
(1992); Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397, 403, 973 P.2d 749, 755 (Ct. App. 
1999). Appellate courts freely review whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists. Edwards v. Conchemco, Inc., 111 Idaho 851, 852, 727 P.2d 1279, 1280 
(Ct. App. 1986). 
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C. Schultz Failed To Present Evidence Supporting A Prima Facie Claim Of 
Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel In Relation To Sentencing 
"To withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must 
present evidence establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the 
claims upon which the applicant bears the burden of proof." State v. Lovelace, 
140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 
583,6 P.3d 831,833 (2000)). Thus, a claim for post-conviction relief is subject to 
summary dismissal "if the applicant's evidence raises no genuine issue of 
material fact" as to each element of the petitioner's claims. Workman v. State, 
144 Idaho 518, 522, 164 P.3d 798, 802 (2007) (citing I.C. § 19-4906(b), (c)); 
Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. 
In order to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137,774 P.2d 299,307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631,634,718 P.2d 283,286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681, 685, 978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
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A post-conviction petitioner may demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective 
where counsel failed to inform him of his right to silence in relation to a 
psychosexual evaluation prepared for sentencing and the petitioner was 
prejudiced. Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 564-565, 149 P.3d 833, 839-840 
(2006). Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not 
make out a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. 
State, 125 Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898,903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
Schultz alleged his counsel "failed to advise [him] of [his] rights against 
self incrimination." (R., p. 10.) He presented an affidavit in which he asserted he 
"was never fully advised of the his [sic] rights against self incrimination ... that 
may result from any or all information he mayor may not disclose during any 
psychological, psychosexual, or social sexual evaluations." (R., pp. 14-15.) The 
allegation that he was not "fully" advised of his rights and that he "mayor may 
not" have disclosed evidence had he been fully advised, without more, does not 
show deficient performance or resulting prejudice. Schultz provided no 
information about what he was or was not informed of regarding his rights 
against self-incrimination and does not even claim that being fully informed would 
have changed his choices in relation to sentencing. The district court did not err 
in concluding that Schultz's claims were conclusory and failed to set forth a prima 
facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Schultz argues that he alleged that "had counsel correctly advised [him] to 
invoke his Fifth Amendment rights and not participate in the court-ordered (non-
privileged) evaluation, [he] presumably would have followed that advice and the 
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extremely prejudicial evaluations would not have been considered by the district 
court at sentencing." (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) This fanciful characterization of 
the pleadings and evidence presented to the district court does not withstand 
analysis. 
First, nowhere does Schultz actually claim that it was counsel's advice 
about whether to invoke his right to silence that was deficient. (See R., p. 10 
(claiming that counsel failed to "advise me of my rights against self 
incrimination"). The only evidence presented does not indicate counsel failed to 
advise Schultz about whether to invoke the right to silence but that counsel did 
not "fully" explain that right in some unspecified way. (R., pp. 14-15.) Schultz's 
attempt to completely re-write his claim on appeal speaks volumes. The district 
court did not err by concluding that the evidence presented by Schultz did not 
amount to a prima facie showing of deficient performance. 
Second, Schultz does not claim that he alleged or presented evidence to 
the district court that, had he been informed of the right to silence he would have 
invoked that right, he instead asks this Court to "presum[e]" he would have done 
so. (Appellant's brief, p. 12.) This Court, however, must base its decision on the 
evidence presented in the record; it was Schultz's duty to present evidence, he 
was not entitled to a presumption of prejudice. See Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 
164 P.3d at 802; Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297. There is no 
evidence of prejudice in this record, and Schultz's request for a presumption in 
lieu of evidence is contrary to applicable legal standards. 
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Review of the evidence presented by Schultz in the form of his verified 
petition and accompanying affidavit shows that he did not present evidence 
showing the elements of his claim. Vague claims of not "fully" explaining rights 
against self incrimination did not show deficient performance and Schultz 
presented no evidence of prejudice. Because he presented only conclusory 
evidence that did not establish his claim, Schultz has failed to show that the 
district court erred by summarily dismissing it. 
II. 
Schultz Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Dismissing His 
Claim Of Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel For Allegedly Failing To Enforce A 
Plea Agreement That Was Never Made 
A. Introduction 
At the time Schultz waived his opposition to being tried as an adult in the 
underlying criminal proceedings, the parties put the status of their plea 
negotiations on the record even though they had not at that time reached a plea 
agreement. State v. Schultz, 150 Idaho 97,98-103,244 P.3d 241, 242-47 (Ct. 
App. 2010). In this post-conviction action Schultz alleged that his attorney in the 
juvenile court was ineffective for failing to inform the prosecutor in adult court of a 
plea agreement, and that his attorney in adult court was ineffective for failing to 
enforce that plea agreement. (R., p. 11.) The district court dismissed Schultz's 
allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to present evidence 
sufficient to establish a prima facie claim. (R., pp. 88-89.) 
On appeal Schultz acknowledges that in the juvenile proceedings a 
"negotiation was placed on the record," that Schultz had asserted on appeal that 
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it was an "agreement," and that in the criminal case the holding that there was no 
"meeting of the minds" at that time, and therefore no agreement, was affirmed on 
appeal. (Appellant's brief, p. 14.) Schultz argues he nevertheless raised a valid 
claim that if he "had been properly advised of all the terms of the agreement, [he 
would] have plead [sic] guilty to the more favorable terms." (Appellant's brief, p. 
15.) This argument on its face makes no sense. Because there was never any 
agreement, there was no need to "properly advise" Schultz of its terms and he 
could not have "plead [sic] guilty" pursuant to the "more favorable terms" of a 
non-existent agreement. 
Reading Schultz's brief on appeal very favorably, it is possible that Schultz 
intended to argue that the plea negotiations put on the record in the juvenile court 
constituted an offer, it was the offer (not the "agreement") that was not explained 
to Schultz, and that he would have accepted the offer and pled guilty according 
to its "more favorable terms." To the extent Schultz is arguing that he asserted a 
claim that counsel failed to convey a plea offer to him,1 Schultz has failed to 
show error. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any 
1 It appears that Schultz may have worded his appellate argument awkwardly to 
deliberately try to make the appellate argument match the pleadings. Unless the 
words "offer" and "agreement" have the same meaning, this Court should reject 
Schultz's attempt to effectively amend his pleadings on appeal. 
S 
affidavits on file and will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences in 
favor of the non-moving party." Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 
798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 
(2002)). 
C. Schultz Failed To Establish A Prima Facie Claim Of Ineffective Assistance 
Of Counsel Regarding A Plea Bargain In The Juvenile Proceedings 
In order to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of 
counsel, a post-conviction petitioner must demonstrate both deficient 
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984); State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137, 774 P.2d 299, 307 
(1989). An attorney's performance is not constitutionally deficient unless it falls 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and there is a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct is within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance. Gibson v. State, 110 Idaho 631, 634, 718 P .2d 283, 286 
(1986); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401,406,775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct. App. 1989). 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must show a reasonable probability that, but 
for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding would have 
been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 1177 
(1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241, 244 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Bare assertions and speculation, unsupported by specific facts, do not make out 
a prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel. Roman v. State, 125 
Idaho 644,649,873 P.2d 898, 903 (Ct. App. 1994). 
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U[D]efense counsel has the duty to communicate formal offers from the 
prosecution to accept a plea on terms and conditions that may be favorable to 
the accused." Missouri v. Frye, _ U.S. _, 132 S.Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012). 
Failure to so communicate can result in prejudice if the petitioner can 
demonstrate that he would have accepted the offer, the prosecution would have 
gone through with the agreement rather than withdraw the offer, and the court 
would have also accepted the agreement. !!L at 1409. Here, however, Schultz 
did not allege any failure to convey any offer. 
Schultz's allegation was as follows: 
my juvenile attorney failing to inform my public defender in adult 
court about the plea bargain, failing to have the agreement in 
writing, failing to hold the prosecutor to the benefit of the bargain, 
likewise, I have the adult court public defender failing to hold the 
prosecutor to the benefit of the bargain reached and partially 
performed on my behalf. 
(R., p. 11 (verbatim).) In his affidavit Schultz stated his counsel was ineffective 
for "allowing the state to violate a stipulated agreement that was the basis for the 
plaintiff's agreeing to being waived into Adult court and the ultimate guilty pleas." 
(R., p. 15 (verbatim).) It is plain from the record that Schultz was not alleging 
failure to communicate a plea offer; he was re-alleging the already rejected claim 
that the parties had reached a plea agreement in the juvenile proceedings. 
If Schultz is arguing on appeal that the statements about the plea 
negotiations placed on the record in his presence were actually a formal plea 
offer by the state that his attorney failed to convey to him, such must be rejected 
as not having been raised in the pleadings below. The actual claim he raised, 
that his attorneys failed to enforce an agreement entered by the parties, was 
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properly dismissed because it had been litigated against him in the underlying 
criminal case. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
summarily dismissing Schultz's petition for post-conviction relief. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 11th day of May, 2012, served a true 
and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a copy 
addressed to: 
DIANE WALKER 
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER 
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho 
Supreme Court Clerk's office. 
KKJ/pm 
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